WHO HE IS 

• China’s most influential realist thinker on power politics. A contrarian in Beijing. A provocation in Washington.

• Dean, Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University

• Architect of “Moral Realism”—a theory that fuses ancient Chinese political philosophy with hard-nosed international relations. Where many see power as tanks, GDP, and technology, Yan insists on something older, and more unsettling: political morality as a force multiplier.

HIS CORE QUESTION

• Why do some great powers rise—and others fall? And why do materially strong states still lose influence, legitimacy, and allies?

• Yan’s answer cuts against both Western liberal optimism and Chinese nationalist triumphalism: Power transitions are not decided by wealth alone, but by leadership, alliances – and moral authority.

HIS KEY IDEA 

• Forget the idea that morality softens realism. Yan argues the opposite: morality is what makes power durable. 

• In his reading of ancient Chinese texts—from Xunzi to Han Feizi—states that ruled through credibility, responsibility, and restraint attracted allies. States that relied only on coercion bred fear. And collapse.

• For Yan, influence means more than just raw force. He harks back to history for examples: the Soviet Union had the world’s largest tank force, nuclear parity with the US, and a space program. And yet it collapsed within six years of its GDP peaking. The United States, despite spending more on defense than the next 10 countries combined, lost in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.

• And in an age where China is considered to be a hegemonic geopolitical player, Yan throws up another stat to explain why economic pace does not necessarily mean stronger alliances. In 2024, China accounted for roughly 18–19% of global GDP (PPP)—but commanded far fewer formal military allies than the US, which leads treaty networks covering over 60 countries.

HIS PREDICTION

• Xuetong feels that China will not automatically replace the US as a global leader. Even if it overtakes the country economically. 

• Why? Because leadership is granted, not seized: “A rising power that scares its neighbors accelerates balancing against itself.” 

• He has warned repeatedly: Assertive diplomacy repels potential allies. Coercive economic tools create fear, not loyalty. And nationalism can mobilize domestically, but alienates internationally.

• China, he feels, risks becoming a “strong but distrusted power” if it prioritises coercion, nationalism, or transactional diplomacy over norms.

THE PUSHBACK

• Interestingly, Xuetong is unpopular on both sides of the spectrum. Liberals critique him because he rejects democracy and human rights as prerequisites for good leadership.

• What’s more, he believes that individuals don’t shape world order. States do. 

• And on the other end, Chinese nationalists accuse him of undermining confidence in China’s rise. Overstating the importance of foreign approval. Being too critical of Chinese actions in Asia. 

• His warning that China could peak without actually leading is deeply unpopular. 

TECH ≠ SOLUTION

Yan is skeptical of techno-solutionism.

His argument:

• AI accelerates decision-making. But compresses political judgment.

• Autonomous weapons reduce human cost. But increase escalation risk.

• Technological superiority does not translate into legitimacy. 

In one lecture, he noted that faster wars are not cleaner wars, just harder to control.

The danger is not machines becoming immoral, but leaders outsourcing responsibility to them.

AT SYNAPSE 

Yan Xuetong will take on questions about a turbulent G-O world. A global order in dismantle. Comforting myths. About inevitable Chinese ascendancy, benevolent American leadership, and technology as destiny. He will argue that the 21st century order will not be shaped by who innovates fastest, but by who governs most responsibly. And how in a world of rising weapons, shrinking trust, and accelerating crises, moral authority is not a luxury, it is a strategic asset.

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